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This paper analyzes the panel data of bi-weekly surveys, 
conducted by the Japan Center for International Finance, on the 
yen/dollar exchange rate expectations of forty-four institutions 
for two years. There are four major findings in this paper. 
First, market participants are found to be heterogeneous. There 
are significant "individual effects" in their expectation 
formation. Second, the individual effects have a characteristics 
of "wishful expectations": exporters expect yen depreciation 
(relative to others), and importers expect yen appreciation 
(relative to others). Third, many institutions are found to 
violate the rational expectations hypothesis. Fourth, forecasts 
with long horizons showed less yen appreciation than those with 
short horizons. Cross-equation constraints implied by the 
consistency of the forecast term structure are strongly rejected 
in the data. 
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1. Introduction 
As rational expectations have become a popular benchmark for thinking 
about financial and macroeconomic hypotheses, many economists have become 
more interested in directly measuring the expectations of market 
participants. Although survey data for many domestic variables, including 
interest rates and inflation rates, have been frequently analyzed by many 
investigators (see, for example, Mishkin (1983; ch. 4)), it is only recently 
that survey data on foreign exchange rates have become available and been 
analyzed. Dominguez (1986) and Frankel and Froot (1987a,b) have exploited 
the survey data made available by the Money Market Service (MMS), the Amex 
Bank Review and the Economist Financial Report. 
The surveys that were investigated by Dominguez, and by Frankel and 
Froot have had only their median responses reported. Heterogeneity among 
market participants, if it exists, has been aggregated out. If the market 
consists of homogeneous agents that share the same forecasting model with 
common beliefs (priors) and information, then the median response would 
sufficiently describe the market in terms of forecasts. However, if market 
participants differ in their forecasting characteristics, then focusing on 
the median misses the most interesting questions such as whether the 
differences persist or are temporary, whether the differences are correlated 
with the participant's traits, and whether a rationality hypothesis is more 
likely to be rejected in individual data. Only individual responses of 
survey data can answer these questions. 
In this paper, I will use the survey data collected by the Japan Center 
fnr Tnt-Pt-nat-innal Finance CJCTF) in Tokyo, which allows me to investigate 
the individual responses in the survey. In particular the JCIF data set has 
two distinct advantages over the data used by Dominguez, and by Frankel and 
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Froot. First, the JCIF data consist of individual responses with no missing 
observations. This is the first paper to study the individual responses of 
exchange rate expectations, although individual responses of inflation 
expectations were studied before by Figlewski and Wachtel (1981). Second, 
not only financial institutions but other companies as well are polled in 
the JCIF survey. Therefore, there is a chance to associate possible 
heterogeneity to the traits of the forecasters1 industry. 
There are four major findings in this paper. First, market participants 
are found to be heterogeneous. There are significant "individual effects" 
in their expectation formation. Second, the individual effects have 
characteristics of "wishful expectations": exporters expect a yen 
depreciation (relative to others), and importers expect a yen appreciation 
(relative to others). Third, many institutions are found to violate the 
rational expectations hypothesis. Most of them underestimated the degree of 
yen appreciation. Fourth, forecasts with long horizons showed less yen 
appreciation than ones with short horizons. Put differently, market 
participants appear to have a "bandwagon" expectation in the short-run, but 
a "stabilizing" one in the long-run. The "twist" in forecast term structure 
could be "consistent" (in the sense of Froot and Ito (1988)), if an iterated 
substitution of a short-term forecast yields a long-term forecast. However, 
cross-equation constraints implied by the consistency are strongly rejected. 
2. Data Summary 
2.A. The Data Description 
The JCIF has conducted telephone surveys twice a month, in the middle 
and at the end of the month, on Wednesdays, since May 1985. Forecasts of 
the yen/dollar exchange rate for the one-, three- and six-month horizons are 
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obtained from foreign exchange experts in 44 companies, including 15 banks 
and brokers, 4 securities companies, 6 trading companies, 9 export-oriented 
companies 5 life insurance companies, and 5 import-oriented industries. 
Each respondent is asked to give a point forecast, for each horizon. In this 
paper, I assume that reported forecasts are the subjective means of respon-
dents. We do not have any data on the subjective variance or range. The 
survey is meticulously arranged so that all 44 companies on the permanent 
list respond every week. 
When a data set is analyzed as panel data, the mean across individuals 
and the mean across time should not be confused. In the following, the mean 
across forty-four individuals at a time will be referred to as the (cross-
section, total) average; the mean across individuals at a time in an 
industry group will be referred to as the group average. The mean across 
time of an individual, of a group, or of the "average" will be referred to 
as the (time) mean of the individual, of the group, or of the average, 
respectively. 
The JCIF calculates the total average, the standard deviation, the 
maximum, and the minimum of the forty-four responses and also the industry 
group averages and the group standard deviations. On the day after the 
survey, the JCIF informs its subscribers, including those who are polled, of 
the summary statistics. The total average is also released to the press and 
other media. 
I will use, in addition to the panel data of the forty-four companies, 
the public information part of the survey, the cross-section average (AVE) 
and MIP g-rnnp averages for the different industries: banks (BAN), securities 
companies (SEC), trading companies (TRA), companies in the export industries 
(EXP), insurance companies (INS), and companies in the import industries 
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(IMP). The unit is yen per one U.S. dollar, so that a negative movement 
indicates a yen "appreciation." The spot exchange rate, s(t), is measured 
at the closing quote in Tokyo on Wednesday of the survey week. 
2.B Overview 
Table 1 shows the time means of (unconditional) expected changes (in 
percent) from the spot rate at the time of survey for the cross-section 
total average, the group averages, and (in a separate distribution table) 
for each individual. For the purposes of discussion, the actual (ex post) 
changes of the spot exchange rate (ACT) for each horizon are reported in the 
same table. For each horizon and each individual or group, subtracting the 
actual changes from the forecasts produces the forecast errors. 
Insert TABLE 1 about here 
In the one-month horizon, the (total) average on a typical week showed 
an expected 1.4 percent yen appreciation. The group averages ranged from a 
0.8 percent to a 2 percent appreciation. Relative to the total average, the 
export industry was the most biased toward a yen depreciation, and the 
trading companies and the import industries were the most biased toward a 
yen appreciation. Looking into individual data, one extreme predicted a 1.4 
percent depreciation of the yen, while the other extreme predicted a 3.1 
percent of appreciation. The distribution of individual forecasts has a 
nice unimodal distribution. The average expected appreciation of the yen in 
the three-month horizon was 1.4 percent, about the same as in the one-month 
horizon. (Note that no adjustment is made with respect to the length of 
horizon.) 
As in the one-month horizon, the export industry shows a yen 
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depreciation bias (from the total average), and the trading companies show a 
yen appreciation bias in the three-month horizon. A wide disagreement among 
individuals begins to appear in the three-month forecasts. It becomes a bi-
modal distribution: one group believes that the yen depreciates from the 
one-month to three-month in the forecast horizon, while the other believes 
that the yen continues to appreciate. 
For the six-month horizon, the total average shows that the market 
expects the yen to return to nearly the prevailing level at the time of 
forecast. This is a sharp turnaround from the forecast of a 1.4 percent yen 
appreciation in three months. In fact, each of the group averages indicates 
that the group anticipates less yen appreciation in the six-month horizon 
than in either the one- or the three-month horizons. 
The findings of this subsection can be summarized and related to the 
contents of the rest of this paper. First, the findings are highly sugges-
tive of heterogeneous market participants. A rigorous analysis and interpre-
tation of the heterogeneity will be provided in Section 3. Second, large 
forecast errors were recorded during the intermittent waves of yen apprecia-
tion after September 1985. Econometric tests on various forms of the 
rational expectation hypothesis will be conducted in Section 4. Third, the 
total average and most of the group averages have a "twist" in their fore-
casts a yen appreciation in the short-horizon and a yen depreciation in the 
long-horizon. Section 5 investigates whether such twists in expectations 
are internally consistent. 
3. Wishful Expectations and Heterogeneity 
3.A.—Econometric Issue -- a spprial rasp, of panel data  
Recall that our micro survey data set consists of forty-four 
individuals and fifty-one observations. Suppose that an individual forecast 
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formation at time t consists of a common structural part based on public 
information, f(l(t)) and an individual effect, g.. For a given forecast 
horizon, k (suppressed notation), the expected exchange rate for individual 
j, j = 1, ... ,J (where in this paper J=44) is 
where se(t) is a k-step ahead forecast of the spot exchange rate at time t, 
by individual j; u-(t) is a pure random disturbance (with respect to j and t) 
representing, for example, a measurement or a rounding error. The cross-
section average of individual forecasts, sfyTy(t) is defined as 
where XAVE^**^ — ^ x-?(t))/J; x = s&» S» and u. Assume f(l(t)) contains a 
constant term so that normalization, gAw = 0> is possible. Then subtracting 
each side of (3.2) from the corresponding side of (3.1), we obtain 
The estimator of the individual effect, g. can be obtained by regressing the 
lefthand side of (3.3) on a constant over the sample period (across time). 
This procedure is simple and robust. It is unnecessary for the 
econometrician to know the exact structure of f(I(t)) as long as it is 
common to everybody for every survey date. 
If the difference in the individual effects of two individuals is to be 
estimated, a similar method can be employed. 
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A (composite) disturbance term in equation (3.3) and (3.A) has mean zero and 
no serial correlations if u.(t) is serially and cross-sectionally 
uncorrelated and f(l(t)) is exactly common to all individuals. 
If the difference in individual beliefs extends to "idiosyncratic" 
coefficients on publicly available information in the structural part, 
f(l(t)), the above procedure needs to be modified, but is still applicable. 
Suppose, for example, that the forecast is in an extrapolative form: 
where g. is the difference in a.. Then the idiosyncratic individual coeffi-
cients can be estimated by regressing the following equations, for all j: 
The above procedure parallels the technique in the panel data analysis, 
although, in the usual examples of the panel data analysis, the right-hand-
side variables take different values for different individuals. Instead, it 
is reasonable here to assume that the structural part and the values of 
regressors (i.e., the past values of the exchange rates) in exchange rate 
forecasts are identical for all individuals, but with possibly different 
coefficients. 
3.B Heterogeneous Participants in the Tokyo Market 
In search of hard evidence for (or against) heterogeneity among market 
participants, I estimate forty-four individual effects, g., and "group 
p.ffp.r.t.qJ1 Tn datantinrr t-hp "grrmp pffprt," a group average forecast calcu-
lated by the JCIF is treated as an individual j, then the total,average (or 
another group average) is subtracted. 
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The individual (or group) effect g., estimated using equation (3.3), 
are reported in Table 2. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
From panel 2.A., we learn that for any horizon, group effects are 
significant for the export industry, with a depreciation bias, and for the 
trading companies, with an appreciation bias. A significant appreciation 
bias was also detected for the import industry for the one-month horizon, 
for the insurance industry for the 3-month horizon, and for the banking 
sector for the six-month horizon. 
The distinctive effect of exporters in contrast to importers or to 
trading companies can be highlighted by measuring the difference in indivi-
dual effects directly, as in equation (3.4). (This is not reported here, see 
Ito (1988).) Exporters have a depreciation bias in their expectation 
formation compared to importers and trading companies for any horizon. 
Panel 2.B shows that, for any horizon, about half of the forty-four 
individuals have a significant bias in their forecasts. The deviations are 
sometimes very large. 
. One might object to a formulation of the individual effects in the form 
of biases in the constant term. They could have different models. Since it 
is not likely that the JCIF or the econometrician could persuade each 
forecaster to justify the forecast with a model every week, we have to guess 
the form, assuming that each market participant has a common autoregressive 
forecasting model, but with different coefficients on the lag terms 
(possibly—because—ef—differences—in—their—prior—beliefs) . As—discussed 
above, idiosyncratic coefficients can be estimated from equation (3.6). The 
results are shown in Table 3. 
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Insert Table 3 about here 
Table 3 once again shows that exporters and trading companies are 
significantly heterogeneous for each of the three horizons. However, the 
differences come from the biases in the individual (constant term) effects, 
not from the idiosyncratic coefficients of the lagged variables. Importers 
for the one-month horizon and banks for the six-month horizon also show the 
individual (constant) effect, as in Table 2.A, but fail to show the idiosyn-
cratic coefficients on the lagged variables. Therefore, the heterogeneity is 
more like a constant bias rather than the differences in reacting to the 
recent changes in the exchange rate. Table 2 and Table 3 show solid evidence 
for heterogeneous expectation formations among market participants. 
3.C Discussion: Heterogeneity and Rational Expectations 
Most of the modern theory of finance and macroeconomics assumes the 
existence of a representative agent whose decision is an aggregate of market 
participants. In fact, the hypothesis of rational expectations would require 
that market participants be homogeneous in their formation of expectations, 
since the true stochastic process is unique. Therefore, findings of 
heterogeneity in this section cast some doubts on the homogeneous agent 
framework commonly used in finance and macroeconomics. 
One might argue that if agents have private information which 
econometricians do not observe, the existence of individual effects may not 
be inconsistent with rational expectations. However, important news and 
variables in the foreign exchange market are generally common knowledge. In 
fact,—ovnn if tho i nr\ i tH Hnal infnrmarinn gpf-c; are* different, the difference 
in expectations conditional on a common (i.e., intersection of) information 
set should be unbiased. The constant term, which detects individual effects, 
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is certainly contained in the common information set. Thus, the finding of 
significant individual biases rejects rational expectations. 
Put differently, under the assumption of rational expectation but 
private information, the forecast differences across individuals, i.e., the 
dependent variables in equation (3.3) and (3.A), must be serially uncorre-
cted, contrary to our findings, provided that lagged group average forecasts 
are part of the common information set (which is the case in the JCIF survey 
as explained in Section 2.A). 
One possible explanation of heterogeneity consistent with rational 
expectations would be a slow learning process due to a strongly biased prior. 
However, one has to model a learning process to assert this. Then, we would 
be able to discuss how biases can be related to individual priors and 
learning processes. This is beyond the scope of this paper. 
3.D Discussion: Wishful Expectations 
Having established heterogeneity, a discussion of why certain market 
participants have depreciation or appreciation biases is in order. From 
Table 2, we notice some regularity in the group effects: in the one-month 
ahead forecasts, exporters have a depreciation bias, while importers have an 
appreciation bias. The exporters' forecasts show a continuing deviation from 
the mean, significantly biased toward a yen depreciation, as the forecast 
horizon lengthens. In the three-month and six-month ahead predictions, 
trading companies, as opposed to importers, show a bias toward appreciation. 
Exporters tend to be long in dollars and importers short in dollars. It 
is difficult to completely cover the exposure to the foreign exchange risk, 
since the forward markets exist only up to a one-year horizon, and timings of 
trade and financial transactions cannot be matched exactly. 
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Therefore, exporters wish that the yen will depreciate in the future, 
enabling their profit margins to increase and their products to compete 
better in the foreign markets. (This argument rests on an assumption of 
incomplete "pass-through," which is documented, for example, by Krugmen 
(1987) and Ohno (1988).) Their responses, being biased toward a yen 
depreciation relative to the average, seem to agree with their wishes. 
On the contrary, importers1 responses reflect their wish for a stronger 
yen so that their import costs will decrease given incomplete path-through. 
Note that the group effect of trading companies behaves like that of import 
industries. One might think that the change in the exchange rate may be 
neutral for trading companies, since they are just intermediaries of imports 
and exports. However, the leading Japanese trading companies handle more 
imports than exports. In 1983, the revenues of the leading nine trading 
companies were derived from export-oriented activities for 20.0%, import-
oriented activities for 23.6%, domestic activities for 40.3%, and trade 
between foreign countries for 16.1% (Shinohara (1986; p. 164)). 
Hence, the findings show that market participants apparently form 
"wishful expectations." (A "Chicago test" for the validity of survey data 
would be to check whether money is where the mouth is. But the result here 
shows that people "put the mouth where money is.") This "wishful expectation" 
(or an "optimist" view in Hey's (1984) sense) may be a reflection of 
nonrational honest mistakes in expectation formation. A straightforward 
interpretation would be for respondents to mix wishful thinking with 
objective forecasts. However, there are a few deeper explanations of 
wishful expectations. 
The Japanese manufacturing and trading companies usually set an 
in-house exchange rate for internal accounting, and the rate can be used for 
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coordinating the sales department with the other departments. It is possible 
that these in-house rates are heterogeneous, and moreover are slightly biased 
so that the sales department is encouraged. The survey responses from these 
companies may be influenced by the biased in-house exchange rate, although 
the respondent is not from the sales department. 
If the announcement of the JCIF survey is very influential on the 
market, the respondent may be induced to try manipulating the announced 
survey result by answering with biased forecasts. Exporters respond to the 
JCIF by announcing a depreciated rate, but only slightly depreciated so as to 
avoid obvious detection, in the hope that the survey mean is biased toward 
depreciation. Exporters hope that the mean expectation with an "unexpected" 
depreciating bias could cause others to start selling yen, thus creating a 
self-fulfilling prophecy; if importers understand that exporters have 
incentives to lie, then importers would counter by manipulating their 
announcements; and vice versa. Thus, as a Nash equilibrium, the mean may not 
be biased after all, although exporters and importers are biased. 
Despite its appeal to economists who are trained to seriously think 
about expectation and manipulation, this story of a manipulative motive has a 
few shortcomings. First, the size of survey, i.e., forty-four respondents, is 
large enough that a manipulation by one respondent is insignificant unless 
the bias is large enough to be easily detected by the JCIF. Second, if other 
participants understand that exporters and importers have incentives to lie, 
then they would not take the JCIF survey seriously, thereby removing the 
incentive to lie. It may be the case that market participants are simply 
naive in forming wishful expectations. 
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4. Rationality of Expectations 
4.A Tests of Unbiasedness and Orthogonality 
In this section, I will apply standard tests of rational expectations to 
o 
this survey data. First, if the forecasts are rational, the forecast errors 
should be random. In other words, survey forecasts should be unbiased. 
Second, given rational expectations, forecast errors should be uncorrelated 
with (orthogonal to) any information available at the time the forecast is 
made. Otherwise, the variable correlated with the ex post error could have 
been exploited to make a better forecast. 
Under the null hypothesis of rational expectations, the realized spot 
rate is the sum of a forecast and a forecast error: 
where h(t,k) is the mean zero forecast error, uncorrelated with any 
variables available at t. It is well known that forecast errors, h(t,k), 
would be serially correlated if the forecast horizon is longer than the 
observational frequency, i.e., k > 2. Therefore, rational expectations imply 
that a=0 and b=l in the following regression: 
The test statistics are calculated using the Generalized Method of Moments to 
take care of the serial correlations of u(t). Results of this unbiasedness 
test are reported in Table A, panel A. 
INSERT TABLE A ABOUT HERE 
Unbiasedness—i q rpjp.r.rpd for trading companies and insurance companies 
of the one-month horizon, for securities and import companies of the three-
month horizon, and for all groups but banks and import industries for the 
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six-month horizon. These rejections are evidence for rejecting a rational 
expectation hypothesis, in that market participants had unbiased forecasts. 
We would miss some rejections if we were only to look at the average of the 
forty-four participants, since for the one-month and three-month horizons, 
rejections by some groups are not detected in the average for all 
participants. 
The second implication of rational expectations is the orthogonality: 
Under the null hypothesis, forecast errors, se(t,k) - s(t+k), are 
uncorrelated with any information, z(t), at time t. In the literature, the 
past forecast errors se(t-k,k)-s(t); the forward premium, f(t,k)-s(t); or the 
recent actual change s(t-k)-s(t) have been popular candidates for variables 
in the information set. I will follow the standard procedure by regressing 
the ex post forecast errors on these candidate variables: 
.where z(t) = se(t-k,k), f(t,k), s(t-k). Rational expectations 
(orthogonality) is a null hypothesis of a=b=0. Results of the estimation of 
equation (4.3), with z(t)=s(t-k), and the test of null hypothesis is reported 
in Table 4, panel B. (Results for other cases of z(t) are essentially the 
same and not reported here. See Ito (1988).) There are only a few instances 
of rejections of the one-month and three-month horizons. However, for the 
six-month horizon, the rejection is unanimous. This is consistent with the 
results of unbiasedness tests. So far, there is little evidence rejecting 
the rational expectation hypothesis for the shorter horizons. 
Variables in the informationsetare not restricted to those tested 
above. When the second lagged term is added, the number of rejection cases 
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increases dramatically. The results of estimating the following equation are 
reported in Table 4, panel C: 
Table 4.C shows rejections for most groups in all horizons. Even if the 
orthogonality test is conducted at the individual level, about three-quarters 
of the individuals are judged to be irrational. 
A.B Discussion: Peso problem and bubbles 
Failing the rationality test in small samples may not imply that 
expectations are formed irrationally, due to the often invoked caveats of 
peso problems and bubbles. (See Obstfeld (1987) and Evans (1986) and 
references thereof for discussions of these issues.) When conditional 
forecasts were formed rationally taking into account a small probability of 
'crash,' but when the crash did not occur in the (small) sample, the forecast 
errors ex post are biased. This is known as the peso problem. The sample 
size of this study is admittedly small (about two years), and this could be a 
reason for a rejection of rationality. 
However, the sample period for this study includes a volatile period 
after the Plaza Agreement of September 1985. (See Ito (1987) for news 
analysis of the exchange rate volatility after the Plaza Agreement.) The 
process of the sharp yen appreciation after the Plaza agreement can be 
regarded as a long-awaited "crash" of the dollar value. However, market 
expectations underestimated the magnitude of this crash. 
In summary, this section shows that most of the market participants 
violate necessary conditions of the rational expectations hypothesis, 
However, these results should be interpreted with caution, because they could 
be a case of a peso problem. 
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5. Expectational Twist 
5.A Introduction to Twist and Consistency 
In this section, the consistency of expectation formation of short- vs. 
long-term expectations, as discussed in Froot and Ito (1988), is explored. 
Frankel and Froot (1987b) showed that the short-term expectations are of the 
bandwagon type, while the long-term expectations show some regressive 
12 
characteristics. Thus, I will first replicate their regressions, and then 
raise the question of how to interpret a "twist" found in the data. 
However, Frankel and Froot (1987b) ignored the consistency issue of 
short- and long-term expectations formation: If expectations formation is 
internally consistent, a long-term forecast should be identical to the 
results of sequential substitutions of short-term forecasts, given a function 
of expectations formation. The consistency becomes a testable hypothesis in 
the form of cross-equation constraints on the coefficients of the short- and 
long-term forecast equations. This consistency problem is parallel to the 
cross-equation constraints implied in the context of the interest rate term 
structure (Sargent (1979)) and in the context of uncovered interest parity 
(Ito (1988) and Ito and Quah (1989)). Froot and Ito (1988) have applied the 
test of consistency to the data collected by Money Market Service (MMS) for 
one-week and one-month ahead forecasts and the Economist Financial Report for 
three-, six- and twelve-month forecasts. They also used the averages from 
the JCIF data. In this paper, the same test is applied to the group means of 
the JCIF data, where one-, three- and six-month forecasts are available. 
5.B An Example of Extrapolative expectation with One Lag 
First, let us consider, following Frankel and Froot (1987b), the 
extrapolative expectation with one lag: 
se(t,k) - s(t) = a + b(s(t-l)-s(t)) + e(t) (5.1). 
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In (5.1), b < 0 implies a (destabilizing) bandwagon effect while b > 0 
implies a stabilizing expectation formation. Results are reported in Table 
5, which shows that the one percent yen appreciation would make the average 
individual expect a further 0.01 percent appreciation in one month. However, 
the Table also implies that the shock would make the same individual form an 
expectation of a 0.13 percent depreciation in three months and a 0.22 percent 
depreciation in six months. Although different groups have different biases, 
the pattern of coefficients, 
b(one month) < b(three month) < b(six month) 
is almost unanimously observed. Hence, we may draw a conclusion, similar to 
that of Frankel and Froot (1987b), that the long-term expectation is more 
stabilizing than the short-term expectation. 
INSERT TABLE 5 about here 
It is easy to show that so long as the extrapolative expectation with 
one lag is assumed, a twist, i.e. an appreciation in the short run and a 
depreciation in the long run, in expectation is impossible. Put differently, 
the assumed formulation is not rich enough for the observed twist to be 
consistent. 
5.C Consistency Tests 
Next, we adopt a distributed lag expectation formulation with more than 
two lags, a formulation rich enough to produce a twist in expectation. 
Consider estimating the following k-month (k= 1,3,6) expectation formations: 
where UirCO a r e independent, random variables representing observation 
errors. After substitution, using the iterated projection (see Froot and Ito 
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(1988)), the consistency restrictions as cross-equation constraints are 
derived (see Table 6). 
Each of two sets of cross-equation restrictions, one-month vs. three 
month, and three-month vs. six-month, is tested separately, and the results 
are reported in Table 6. The consistency is overwhelmingly rejected in this 
formulation, too. 
INSERT TABLE 6 about here 
5.D Discussion: Inconsistency 
I hasten to add a caveat. If we misspecify the expectation formation, 
then the results in this section are not valid. For example, if a policy 
switch, such as a monetary tightening, is expected to occur around the second 
month from the point of forecasting, it is "consistent" to have a twist, 
although the test in this paper would not capture it. 
One might think that people use different economic variables for 
forecasting the future spot rate with different horizons. For example, chart 
(technical) analysis, which is a special case of (univariate) distributed lag 
expectation formations, is used for the short-term horizon, but other factors 
come into consideration for the long-term horizon. A list of other factors 
includes trade balances, inflation rate differentials, interest rate 
differentials, fiscal deficits and policy switches. However, if these 
factors are relevant in the long-run, they should be relevant in the short-
13 
run, although the effect may be small in the short-run. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Tn t-rt-ic! pappr, np.wly-available survey data on the expected exchange rate 
in the Tokyo market were used to test several hypotheses regarding 
expectation formations. The JCIF data set is better than the data sets 
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previously used by Frankel and Froot (1987a,b), in that the survey includes 
the expectations of different industries, not only of banks and financial 
institutions but also of exporters and importers. Moreover, individual 
responses can be used to avoid the aggregation problem altogether. 
Following are the major findings of this paper: First, market 
participants are heterogeneous, with constant-term biases in their 
expectation formations. Second, "wishful expectations" were found: 
exporters (importers) are biased toward yen depreciation (appreciation) 
relative to others. Third, when the usual rationality tests were applied, 
among different groups, the unbiasedness of expectation was rejected in a few 
instances for shorter horizons and unanimously rejected in the six-month 
horizon. Orthogonality was soundly rejected. We may conclude that we have 
strong evidence against rational expectation formation in the Tokyo foreign 
exchange market. Fourth, consistency is overwhelmingly rejected, given that 
the expectation formation is a distributed lag structure with two lags. 
The present paper suggests that it is important to consider a model with 
heterogeneous agents for the international financial market. I hope that 
this paper stimulates;the research in this direction. 
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* I gratefully acknowledge the help and encouragement from Tomomitsu Oba, 
Shoji Ochi and Eisuke Sakakibara in allowing me access to the JCIF 
proprietary data for academic purposes only. Discussions with Jeffrey A. 
Frankel, Kenneth A. Froot, Hidehiko Ichimura, Mark Machina, Maurice 
Obstfeld, Thomas Sargent, and Christopher Sims were very useful. I have 
benefited from comments received from the participants of a session in the 
Econometric Society meeting of December 1988, and of seminars at Harvard 
University, the University of Minnesota, the University of California at San 
Diego, the National Bureau of Economic Research, and the Bank of Japan. 
Comments by three anonymous referees on the earlier version of the paper 
contributed to several significant improvements. Financial support from 
National Science Foundation (SES 88-08828) is gratefully acknowledged. 
1. Dominguez (1986) used the Money Market Service (MMS) data from 1983 to 
1985 to test a rational expectations hypothesis. Unbiasedness and the 
independence of forecast errors from the forward premium were tested. She 
found that survey forecasts were no better than the spot rate in predictive 
power and that rationality was in general rejected. In addition to the MMS 
data, Frankel and Froot (1987a,b) exploited the survey data collected by 
Amex Financial Service, and the Economist, which have longer sample periods 
and different forecast horizons. They found that expectations do respond to 
exchange rate changes. Moreover, short-term forecasts are more 
"destabilizing" than long-term forecasts; that is, the response to the 
degree of forecasted appreciation in response to appreciation is larger in 
the short-term horizon than in the long-term. 
Footnotes page 1 
2 The first few surveys were conducted not on Wednesdays but on the middle 
and last business days of the month. However, the survey date was fixed on 
Wednesday after the fourth observation. A twice-a-month survey means that 
observations are usually biweekly, with a couple of exceptions in a year. 
That is, there are 24, instead of 26, observations in the JCIF data in 52 
weeks. It is unfortunate that the interval is not fixed. In the following, 
I disregard the problem arising from a mix of two and three week intervals. 
The survey started with 42 companies and expanded to the current 44 after 
the fourth survey in July 1985. 
3 
Since the micro panel data set was made available on the condition that 
the anonymity of the source should be honored, it is impossible to aggregate 
the individuals into groups. 
For some cases, an allowance had to be made for AR(1) serial correlation 
in u.(t)-u^Yj.(t), or in u.(t)-Uj1(t), contrary to the assumptions mentioned 
earlier. This may be due to either serial correlation in u. or to 
deviations in f(l(t)) among individuals. However, many of rejection cases 
(i.e., confirming heterogeneity) are found without AR(l) disturbances. 
I owe the observation in the paragraph to an anonymous referee. There 
have been some investigations examining whether diverse expectations can be 
rational depending upon agents1 information sets (see, for example, Feldman 
(1987), Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Frydman (1982, 1987).) 
One might think that intelligent persons like professional traders and 
Hpalprs ran qpparatp wishful thinking from scientific forecasts. However, 
there is some evidence in the psychology literature, kindly suggested by 
Kenneth J. Arrow, that wishful thinking is rather common in social cognition 
Footnotes page 2 
and views of the self. 
"Theories of the causal attribution process, prediction, judgments of 
covariation, and other tasks of social inference incorporated the 
assumptions of the naive scientist as normative guidelines with which 
actual behavior could be compared. 
It rapidly became evident, however, that the social perceiver's 
actual inferential work and decision making looked little like these 
normative models. Rather, information processing is full of incomplete 
data gathering, shortcuts, errors, and biases. In particular, prior 
expectations and self-serving interpretations weigh heavily into the 
social judgement process." (Taylor and Brown (1988), with an emphasis 
added). 
One might think that there may be self-selection among entrepreneurs and 
dealers: Those who are optimistic about the yen appreciation (depreciation) 
develop import (export, resp.) business. However, the JCIF polls include 
only leading companies, so that it is difficult to imagine that they change 
their types of business due to exchange rate expectations. Those who are in 
charge of foreign exchange expectations and trades in those companies are 
usually in-house staff, who are subject to a lifetime employment practice. 
It is hardly the case in Japan that foreign exchange professionals hop 
companies according to their biases in expectations. 
For the aspects of econometrics, see Mishkin (1983). The same procedure 
has been applied to the MMS data by Dominguez (1986). In this paper, I 
assume that reported forecasts in the survey are the subjective means of 
respondents. However, if agents were reporting the medians of a skewed 
subjective distribution, then the results of rationality tests could be 
affected. 
~o ~ ~ 
However, Muth (1961) originally interpreted rational expectations as 
applying only to aggregate expectations. 
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. If the forward rate is used in place of expectation of survey data, as 
is the case in papers other than ones with survey data, risk aversion is 
another source of bias in forecast errors. 
In that sense it may seem inappropriate to invoke the peso problem 
explanation in the usual sense for this period. The biased forecast errors 
due to the underestimation of the magnitude of a crash could be called the 
"Plaza problem." Both "peso problems," which arise when an infrequent crash 
did happen, and "Plaza problems," which occur when an infrequent crash did 
happen, are small sample problems. Moreover, the latter is a special case 
of peso problems: A policy switch, including interventions, could halt a 
dollar decline and reverse the movement with a small probability. That did 
not happen in the small sample. 
1") 
Frankel and Froot (1987b) showed, using the MMS, the Economist, and the 
AMEX data sets, that short- and long-term expectations seem to have 
different characteristics. The data set with the short-term horizon yields 
the estimates indicating a bandwagon type (extrapolative) effect, while the 
data set with the long-term horizon yields results with a more regressive 
nature. However, the direct comparison of the short-term and long-term 
horizons is limited in their study, due to the spread of horizons across 
different data sets and different sample periods. 
Suppose that uncovered interest parity (no risk premium) holds. An 
interest rate differential of six percent implies that the exchange rate 
changes by approximately three percent in six months, a significant and 
easily detenctable change. However, it predicts only a 0.5 percent change 
in one month, a change which is small and may escape detection. 
Footnotes page 4 
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